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TIME FOR A
Turnaround
Paul Keating is relearning about the economy fast. 
Roy Green suggests he also needs to unlearn some of the 
80s orthodoxy about industry policy. A sensible industry 
policy for the 90s is, he argues, a vital element in the 
renewal of Labor's vision.
H istory is against governments at­tempting a strategic realignment during their term of office. It is usual­
ly something undertaken in opposi­
tion, and most governments which try their hand 
at it are probably destined for the opposition 
benches anyway.
The last government to try were the Social Democrats in 
Sweden, who subsequently lost power to a conservative 
coalition. On the other side of politics, the British Tories 
have made an extraordinary attempt to shift ground with 
the replacement of Mrs Thatcher by the affable 'Butskellite' 
John Major. Whether the attempt is successful will depend 
on overcoming the traditional contempt of the electorate 
for a government which could not get it right the first time 
around.
This is not to say that internal renewal is impossible. After 
all, governments are constantly having to adapt their
policies to changed circumstances—often with some suc­
cess, as we have seen on a number of occasions in the life 
of the present Labor government in Australia. The later it 
is left, however, the harder it becomes to explain away past 
'mistakes' and, even more importantly, to rekindle support 
for a new approach.
What then, are the chances of a Labor government led by 
Paul Keating renewing itself in time for the next election? 
Not good, say the commentators. Everyone knows that 
Keating was the architect of the policies from which he and 
his new Treasurer are now desperately trying to distance 
themselves. And the scope to take radical measures, as he 
also recognises, is severely limited by the deteriorating 
international situation.
Yet Keating could still square the circle provided that he 
resists the temptation, held out by some commentators, to 
move further in the direction of Dr Hewson's economic 
plan, and begins instead to stake out new ground for 
Labor's social democratic philosophy. The one opportunity
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he has to retake the initiative is the economic statement to 
be released later this month, and the ground which must 
be staked out there, in clear and distinctive terms, is a new 
approach to industry policy. Of course, the statement must 
address the problem of short-term job creation, but it must 
also, to be credible, establish a longer term vision of what 
Labor stands for in the 1990s and how it is different from 
the conservative Opposition.
I shall argue that industry policy is the ground on which 
Labor could, at least potentially, develop a substantial 
strategic advantage not only with the trade union move­
ment but also with the wider electorate. It means, however, 
overturning the complacent reliance on unfettered markets 
associated with Canberra's key economic ministries and, 
instead, constructing a more interventionist approach to 
microeconomic reform, which has so far placed the burden 
of change on wages policy. The point is not just that the 
economic orthodoxy has got it theoretically wrong, but that 
it is increasingly irrelevant. Like old-fashioned state plan­
ning, it has been superseded by the evolution of new 
technologies and production systems in world competitive 
manufacturing firms.
The trend in all successful economies is now towards 
strategic industry policies combined with greater worker 
involvement in economic decision-making. This is ob­
viously fertile territory for the renewal of Labor's 
philosophy since it offers a coherent social democratic 
vision of the future which also happens to make good 
practical sense; and it is far removed from the paternalistic 
ideology of the 'New Protection' introduced early this 
century. With a little reshaping of tripartite structures, the 
institutional prerequisites are in place in Australia today 
for the design of such a strategy, and the shift in wages 
policy to productivity bargaining provides ordinary trade 
unionists with the opportunity to play a major role in its 
implementation.
So far, the basic assum ptions behind the Labor 
government's microeconomic reform agenda have been 
those of orthodox economics. It is important at the outset 
to understand what these are, and what they imply for 
current policy before considering an alternative approach. 
They state that optimal efficiency is achieved only by creat­
ing perfectly competitive markets, including those for fac­
tors of production such as labour. Essentially, this means 
removing 'impediments' to the operation of free markets 
and eschewing any form of intervention which may 
'distort' the necessary competitive signals.
The impediments these economists have in mind in the 
product market are tariffs and other protectionist (and 
'new protectionist') measures and, in the labour market, 
the traditional wage-fixing role of the Industrial Relations 
Commission. Ideally, they would also include in these 
impediments the monopoly power of trade unions. But, 
unlike the Thatcher government's notorious 1985 Employ­
ment W hite Paper and its local counterpart in the 
Australian O pposition's industrial relations policy, 
Labor's Accord with the ACTU precludes any attempt to 
free up the labour market in this way. Instead, market 
economists here must be satisfied with the decentralisation
of wage fixing, as a means of approximating the price of 
labour to its marginal productivity, rather than its 
wholesale deregulation with the removal of minimum 
legal rights and standards.
It is not my intention to argue here that the government's 
reforms of product and labour markets have been futile. 
Far from i t  What I would suggest, however, is that progress 
in this area since 1983 has been achieved despite rather than 
because of the assumptions which underlie the policy. 
Moreover, the current policy paralysis is due in large 
measure to the failure of the government either to follow 
these assumptions through to their logical conclusion 
which is found in the Opposition program or, on the other 
hand, to jettison the assumptions explicitly in favour of a 
more interventionist approach. The first approach implies 
an open confrontation with the trade union movement and 
would mark a further step towards a low wage, low 
productivity economy in Australia; the second, as we shall 
see would permit the government to chart a course for a 
high wage, high productivity future.
In this country, perhaps uniquely, wages and industry 
policies have had to carry the stigma of their common 
origin in the nexus between industry protection and 
centralised arbitration in the early part of the century. It is 
at least arguable that, at the time, this pairing permitted a 
higher level of output and employment in manufacturing 
and a growth of real wages than would otherwise have 
been possible—but circumstances in Australia and the 
world economy have since changed beyond all recogni­
tion.
The main problem with the traditional protectionist 
strategy was that there was no incentive in the tariff policy 
arrangements, or in the associated strategies of multina­
tional firms in Australia, to develop world competitive 
manufacturing technologies and work practices. The prob­
lem was accentuated in the post-war period not only by the 
secular downward trend of primary commodity prices, 
which contributed to macroeconomic instability as well 
(the 'stop-go' cycle), but also by the increasing trade 
dominance of high value-added—the so-called 'elaborate­
ly transformed'—manufactured goods.
While manufactures in general were already established as 
the fastest growing area of world trade at the onset of the 
post-war boom, by the mid-1980s, according to recent cal­
culations, high research-intensive manufactures were the 
fastest growing specialised segment of trade in manufac­
tures. This has become known as the 'new competition'. If 
the case for comprehensive tariff protection has disin­
tegrated in this environment, the question still remains 
what should replace it: the free market or a new outward- 
looking approach to industry policy.
The policy response in Australia to the growing sig­
nificance of high value-added manufacturing in world 
trade has been of two types. The first, largely developed by 
the Industry Commission and its predecessors, was based 
on the classical theory of comparative advantage. By reduc­
ing, and ultimately eliminating, tariff protection, it was 
argued that this approach would permit only efficient and
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competitive firms to survive, thus bringing down the cost 
of all goods and services to Australian consumers and 
enhancing general economic welfare.
The approach is epitomised by the Garnaut report, 
Australia and the North-East Asian Ascendancy (1990), which 
recommended an ideologically pure zero tariff regime by 
the year 2000. Any approach of this kind has costs and 
drawbacks, however—drawbacks which are usually 
downplayed. The main defects in the Garnaut approach 
are , firstly, that there is no mechanism, apart from spon­
taneous entrepreneurial combustion, by which inefficient 
firms can become efficient and competitive and, second, 
that the closure of 'inefficient' manufacturing firms tends 
only to reinforce Australia's dependence on primary com­
modity exports. Perhaps most importantly, the incon­
venient fact which proponents of this approach fail to 
address is that world trade today is characterised not by 
comparative advantage but rather by 'comparative 
disadvantage' for resource-based economies.
By 'comparative disadvantage' I mean the tendency in 
resource-based economies for the exchange rate to rise 
above the level at which manufactured export and import 
substitutes can become competitive, even with significant 
efficiency improvements. This problem is compounded by 
the fact that devaluation, particularly where it occurs as a 
result of an unfavourable reversal in the terms of trade, can 
also prove counter-productive due to the combination of 
sudden and unpredictable cost pressures and the belief 
that the potential advantages offered by devaluation may 
only be temporary.
This was the effect that large North Sea oil and gas dis­
coveries had on the Netherlands and UK, where the 
decimation of manufacturing firms (mainly in the price 
sensitive engineering and capital goods sectors) by policy 
adaptation to commodity-based exchange rate fluctua­
tions became known as the 'Dutch disease'.
By contrast, economies without a significant resource sec­
tor, such as Germany and Japan, have been able to adjust 
exchange rates to the goal of long-term competitiveness in 
high value-added manufacturing, thus maintaining con­
tinuity in their investment, training and research and 
development strategies. Ironically, instead of using 
agricultural or resource surpluses to subsidise employ­
ment in 'sheltered industries', these economies are able to 
subsidise their farmers and (in the case of Germany) gross­
ly inefficient coal producers out of the surpluses generated 
in manufacturing.
The second type of policy response to the problems faced 
by resource-based economies, initiated publicly in 
Australia by the 1979 Crawford report on structural adjust­
ment, has been to recognise the necessity of "gradual 
reductions in some Australian protection levels" but only 
as part of an "industrial development policy". This ap­
proach is now identified with the Australian Manufactur­
ing Council (AMC) report, The Global Challenge: Australian 
Manufacturing in the 1990s (1990), which, although not 
theoretically explicit in its assumptions, nevertheless
places the emphasis on making domestic industry com­
petitive in conjunction with reducing tariffs rather than 
undertaking tariff reform in isolation from other instru­
ments of policy.
It is claimed, of course, that the 'new7 approach to industry 
policy is nothing more than an attempt to resurrect the old, 
discredited protectionist arrangements in a different guise. 
The lack of evidence for this claim is matched only by the 
enthusiasm  with which it has been em braced by 
newspaper editorial writers and officials in the federal 
bureaucracy. The new approach stems both from modem 
theories of how markets work (or don't work, as the case 
may be) and from the recent experience of more successful 
industrialised nations. In particular, there are two features 
of this approach which distinguish it fundamentally from 
previous attempts at industry policy in Australia.
Labor has shown little sign 
of accepting an industry 
policy which dares to 
speak its name
The first feature is the shift in the rationale for tariff protec­
tion and industrial assistance from the retention of jobs in 
manufacturing industry, however uncompetitive, to the 
preparation of firms and sectors for carefully targeted 
export strategies in world markets. The second, as I noted 
above, is the transformation in the primary role of wages 
policy from centralised pay fixing, which characterised the 
'historic compromise' between labour and capital in the 
early part of the century, to support and facilitation of work 
reorganisation, training and joint consultation at the 
workplace.
Since 1983, the Labor government has shown little sign of 
accepting the case for an outward-looking industry policy 
which dares to speak its name except, as we see in a 
moment, at the margins where it has been tolerated on the 
grounds of demonstrable market failure. Curiously, how­
ever, it has offered less resistance to the idea of permitting 
the vacuum to be filled by wages policy, particularly in its 
most recent incarnation as award restructuring.
The result of this accommodation between the prescrip­
tions of economic orthodoxy and the power relationships 
of the Accord has been internal inconsistency at best, with 
the ever present danger of the whole strategy collapsing 
under the weight of its own contradictions. With the good 
fortune of the demand expansion phase of the strategy now 
evaporating in the recession along with L abor's 
popularity, the contradictions are laid bare and require a 
resolution if disaster is to be avoided at the next election. 
To understand the steps which must now be taken, it is 
necessary first to retrace briefly those already taken in the 
two phases which characterise the government's approach 
to industry policy and labour market reform so far.
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In both phases of policy, the government's product market 
reforms were largely centred on across-the-board tariff 
cuts, though in the initial phase they also included a num­
ber of ad hoc industry plans to reinvigorate traditionally 
protected areas of manufacturing. However, these modest 
plans were not sustained or extended to other sectors. Nor 
were they matched by support from labour market policy 
which, at this stage, consisted mainly of employment and 
training measures and an abstract commitment to 'in­
dustrial democracy'. The 1986 Heavy Engineering plan, for 
example, had to make do with a provision malting assis­
tance to firms conditional upon jointly negotiated changes 
in work practices.
Crucially, apart from the handful of industry plans, there 
were no formal industry policy structures established to 
ensure that company decisions on investment were open 
to wider scrutiny and accountability. Nor were legal rights 
and opportunities provided for workers to influence those 
decisions. The government's approach at this time 
proceeded on the assumption that once the macro- 
economic settings were in place the market would deliver 
the necessary investment in new technologies and skills. 
But, to the government's evident surprise, the assumption 
was found wanting.
The terms of trade collapse of 1985/86 created the condi­
tions for the second phase of policy which signalled the 
government's recognition of the limitations of macro 
policy by shifting the focus to microeconomic reform. The 
problem was that whatever intentions some may have had 
of using the micro reform agenda to bring bade industry 
policy to centre stage, its dominant thrust became ac­
celerated tariff reductions and the removal of transport 
bottlenecks, especially on the waterfront—with which 
landlocked Canberra has been obsessed for decades.
The conclusion drawn from the first phase of policy was 
not that the market had failed to operate in accordance with 
the theory, but that the impediments to its operation had 
not yet successfully been eliminated. The only area where 
outright market failure was openly acknowledged and met 
with intervention was training, on which expenditure by 
companies clearly lagged behind international best prac­
tice. However, the reason why an exception had to be made 
there was not that the case for industrial policy had been 
conceded but, rather, that training was essential to progress 
in award restructuring and, as a result of initiatives taken 
by the union movement in the context of the Accord, award 
restructuring had become the central mainstay of wages 
policy.
Indeed, it is a peculiarity of Australian economic manage­
ment in recent years that wages policy and labour market 
reform have been made to bear the weight that in other 
countries would be carried, or at least shared, by industrial 
policy. Just as the focus of economic management shifted 
after the trade crisis from a macro growth strategy to micro 
reform, so the emphasis of wages policy changed from 
overall wage restraint to workplace productivity improve­
ment through industry and enterprise bargaining.
Since wage restraint had not contributed to the investment 
needed to increase productivity, more direct measures 
were required at the workplace, where nominal wage 
growth was less economically significant than the growth 
of unit labour costs. These measures were first signalled in 
the 1987 two-tier wage system which opened the way for 
workplace negotiations on 'restructuring and efficiency', 
and then more comprehensively in the Industrial Relations 
Commission's award restructuring decisions of 1988/89, 
which established a framework for genuine productivity 
bargaining.
The m easures were supplem ented by the federal 
government's Workplace Reform Program, established by 
the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), which fea­
tured a network of Workplace Resource Centres as well as 
more traditional assistance packages to union and 
employer organisations engaged in the rewriting of 
awards. These centres anticipated the need to translate the 
new awards into action at workplace level, without which 
award restructuring would have been futile. They were 
designed to provide advice and information on a commer­
cial basis to firms in the process of restructuring, but only 
on condition that the process was operated through joint 
consultative machinery.
In addition, largely as a result of the AMC report referred 
to earlier, the government announced the introduction of 
a Best Practice Demonstration Program which would en­
courage selected firms to adopt international best practice 
approaches at the workplace. This program, to be run 
jointly by the AMC and DIR, is a further indication of the 
degree to which industrial policy may be pursued 
legitimately only in the guise of workplace reform.
It was with considerable unease and after some delay, 
however, that the Industrial Relations Commission was 
prepared in October 1991 to issue formal guidelines for 
productivity bargaining with no overall pay limit. Even so, 
the guidelines were well framed—and, by stipulating the 
need for joint consultation arrangements at the workplace, 
they provide workers and unions with a further oppor­
tunity to widen the bargaining agenda, possibly to encom­
pass decisions on investment as well as training and work 
reorganisation.
This could, if handled correctly, become a source of 
strength for workplace managers, rather than simply a 
threat to their decision-making prerogatives (particularly 
in the light of evidence from the Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) showing that the 
major constraint on workplace performance in Australia is 
not union obstruction but the policies of management 
beyond the workplace. Nevertheless, the problem with 
workplace bargaining from the viewpoint of economic 
strategy is its unco-ordinated character. Thus there is still 
an important role for wider, preferably tripartite structures 
to promote the development of coherent sector-based 
strategies.
The relevance of the sector level to industrial policy has 
been enhanced in recent years by the trend from traditional 
mass production industries, where economies of scale
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were the crucial factor, to more flexible manufacturing 
systems whose effectiveness requires carefully managed 
interdependence between smaller units of production. This 
interdependence has given rise to the much admired 
'dusters' of competitive industrial success in places like 
Emilia-Romagna in northern Italy and Baden Wurttem- 
burg in south-west Germany.
Such clusters cannot be imposed by state planning, but nor 
do they emerge spontaneously from the actions of in­
dividual entrepreneurs. Their growth and development 
must effectively be co-ordinated within structures which 
guide and assist firms with production techniques, person­
nel practices, producer-user linkages ('networking') and 
marketing strategies. The idea that these structures would 
have to 'pick winners' is a relic of past debates about 
planning versus the market, where the state is assumed to 
be the agency of planning. In this new approach to in­
dustrial policy, it would be more accurate to say that the 
winners have the opportunity to pick themselves within
the framework of a sector strategy which they have collec­
tively devised in co-operation with the government
The appropriate agency for industrial policy in the 
Australian context must be a tripartite institution, with not 
merely advisory but executive powers, which is based on 
a network of sector planning bodies with representation 
from unions and employers. The role of the government is 
then not to impose a blueprint on industry, but to discuss 
and agree a range of strategies in each sector—encompass­
ing, say, export fadlitation—which would be supported by 
advisory and information services and, where related to 
the fulfilment of an agreed strategy, direct assistance to 
firms.
The national tripartite forum would have the task of ensur­
ing that sector strategies are consistent both within in­
dustry itself and with the government's broad macro 
settings. This would imply, for example, particularly in the 
recent period, that a current account improvement would 
not be sought solely by using monetary policy to depress 
demand. The reason is obvious. Not only are firms affected 
by high interest rates, but the influx of capital, as we have 
seen, drives up the exchange rate, making even relatively 
efficient firms uncompetitive. It is a classic case of incon­
sistency between macro and micro objectives, which 
would not arise if industry policy were to be assigned a 
central role.
There are many tripartite institutions in Australia (perhaps 
too many) which might be considered as candidates for the 
role I have described. The development of a new approach 
to industrial policy may well be the occasion for imparting 
a sense of purpose and coherence to the 'alphabet soup' of 
such bodies. In particular, a merger of the Economic Plan­
ning Advisory Coundl (EPAC) with the AMC would be 
desirable because it would not only permit the macro and 
micro dimensions of economic policy to be fused, but 
would also establish a 'transmission mechanism' to firms 
through the AMC's industry coundls which, at least poten­
tially, form the basis of the proposed sector planning 
bodies.
The main task of the government, then, is not to intervene 
directly in the running of industry but to create the neces­
sary 'supply side' framework for investment in long-term 
growth and jobs. This means developing representative 
tripartite structures, so that the elements of an agreed 
industrial policy may be developed, and providing legal 
rights for workers to information and consultation, so that 
the resulting sector strategies maybe matched by strategies 
at the workplace. A new industry policy which releases the 
initiative and creativity of the Australian workforce in this 
way is the key to a high wage, high productivity economy. 
It also gives Labor the opportunity to shape a clear and 
compelling vision of sodal democracy for an extended 
period of government in the 1990s and beyond.
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Hewson's Package:
What are we Fighting?
The "Fightback" Package Assessed 
Sunday 16th February, 
2nd Floor, 327 Sussex St., Sydney. 
12.30pm- 5.30 pm.
The Liberal-National Party Coalition,with their 
"Fightback" package, claim their policies can reverse 
the worst economic recession since the 1930s. Is it a 
strategy for economic recovery, or will it lead to a 
dramatic increase in inequality and poverty in 
Australia? Who would gain, and who would lose, 
from such a program? How would such policies 
affect us, and what would they mean for Australia in 
the future?
Topics include: 
•Economic Rationalism and the 
New Right 
•"Fightback" and Inequality 
•GST: "Greedy Shifting Tax"? 
•Hewson & the Environment.
Speakers include: ‘ Frank Stilwell (Political 
Economy,Univ. of Sydney) *Pat Ranald 
(PSU) *Peter Davidson (ACOSS) *Eva Cox 
(W EL) ‘ Speaker from A ustra lian  
Conservation Foundation.
Organised by the New Left Party.
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